Yesterday I introduced the topic of nuclear power and its relationship to nuclear proliferation. For those of you who are interested in a great read on the history of nuclear proliferation, I highly recommend Thomas Reed's and Danny Stillman's book, "The Nuclear Express", published in 2009. It's a rear page-turner. Should be in the library of everyone who's interested in the subject...
Cheers,
Sherrell
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Monday, February 7, 2011
Post # 24: Imperative 5 – Decoupling Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation
I apologize for the recent hiatus in my postings here. I've been in a transition in my day job and it has definitely put a crimp in my blogging... Hopefully I'll be a little more consistent in the coming months...
My recent postings have focused on the Five Imperatives of Nuclear Power. Now it's time for the Fifth Imperative: Assure the deployment of nuclear power does not result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This topic has been a subject of heated debate since the inception of commercial nuclear power in the 1950's and early 1960's. President Eisenhower faced this challenge during his "Atoms For Peace" campaign.
It is widely understood there are three paths to attaining nuclear weapons. The proliferating entity can either attain the uranium enrichment capability needed to produce weapons-grade uranium; attain the nuclear fuel, reactor, and nuclear fuel reprocessing capability needed to produce weapons-grade plutonium; or simply steal the required uranium or plutonium. History suggests both production paths have been successfully deployed by proliferating entities. As far as we know, no one has stolen sufficient material to become a member of the nuclear weapons club.
I will have additional postings on this topic in the future. The subject I want to address here is the often-used term "proliferation risk". I don't like the term because I feel it is technically imprecise at best, and terribly mis-leading at worst.
The term "risk" has a precise engineering definition. It is the sum, over all event paths and outcomes, of the product of the probability of a contributing event, and the consequence of that event.
Risk = Summation over all events of (Event Probability X Event Consequence).
We talk about the risk of smoking as "expected cancer deaths" or "expected cancers". If someone wishes to discuss the "risk of an automobile accident", one must first define the term "automobile accident", all of the accidents of interest, all of the events that lead to these accidents, and the probabilities of each of these events.
The first problem with apply this risk terminology to nuclear proliferation is that no on has ever been able to precisely define "proliferation" beyond simply "obtaining a nuclear weapon". In order to usefully apply the risk equation, one must be able to deconvolve "proliferation" into its constitute chain of events. Is enriching a gram of uranium "proliferation"? Is losing a gram of uranium or plutonium "proliferation"? Loosing 1 kg ? Think about all of the events that must occur for uranium ore in the ground to become uranium in a weapon. Get the point?
The second stumbling block in applying the risk equation to nuclear proliferation is the "probability" of "proliferation" is almost completely dominated by human will and intent. Indeed, there are two components of this probability: the probability someone will attempt to divert a technology, and the probability they will succeed in doing so. In practice, advocates of the "proliferation risk" vocabulary typically assume the magnitude of the first "probability" is unity (1.0), and then move on to the rest of the story – often without any useful definition of the chain of events under consideration.
It is true some technologies are easier to divert for clandestine purposes that others. And it is possible to build technical barriers and "self-reporting" technologies into nuclear fuels, reactors, and reprocessing facilities. But given an infinitely evil, infinitely rich, infinitely intelligent, and infinitely wealthy adversary, it's probably impossible to design a system that is "proliferation-proof". (And of course, the other challenge is that many of the technologies that enhance the proliferation resistance of nuclear technologies also make them more expensive for legitimate energy production purposes.)
So, enough musings for this posting. The topic of nuclear power and proliferation is very complicated, and men and women of good will can disagree strongly on many aspects of the debate.
Cheers...
My recent postings have focused on the Five Imperatives of Nuclear Power. Now it's time for the Fifth Imperative: Assure the deployment of nuclear power does not result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This topic has been a subject of heated debate since the inception of commercial nuclear power in the 1950's and early 1960's. President Eisenhower faced this challenge during his "Atoms For Peace" campaign.
It is widely understood there are three paths to attaining nuclear weapons. The proliferating entity can either attain the uranium enrichment capability needed to produce weapons-grade uranium; attain the nuclear fuel, reactor, and nuclear fuel reprocessing capability needed to produce weapons-grade plutonium; or simply steal the required uranium or plutonium. History suggests both production paths have been successfully deployed by proliferating entities. As far as we know, no one has stolen sufficient material to become a member of the nuclear weapons club.
I will have additional postings on this topic in the future. The subject I want to address here is the often-used term "proliferation risk". I don't like the term because I feel it is technically imprecise at best, and terribly mis-leading at worst.
The term "risk" has a precise engineering definition. It is the sum, over all event paths and outcomes, of the product of the probability of a contributing event, and the consequence of that event.
Risk = Summation over all events of (Event Probability X Event Consequence).
We talk about the risk of smoking as "expected cancer deaths" or "expected cancers". If someone wishes to discuss the "risk of an automobile accident", one must first define the term "automobile accident", all of the accidents of interest, all of the events that lead to these accidents, and the probabilities of each of these events.
The first problem with apply this risk terminology to nuclear proliferation is that no on has ever been able to precisely define "proliferation" beyond simply "obtaining a nuclear weapon". In order to usefully apply the risk equation, one must be able to deconvolve "proliferation" into its constitute chain of events. Is enriching a gram of uranium "proliferation"? Is losing a gram of uranium or plutonium "proliferation"? Loosing 1 kg ? Think about all of the events that must occur for uranium ore in the ground to become uranium in a weapon. Get the point?
The second stumbling block in applying the risk equation to nuclear proliferation is the "probability" of "proliferation" is almost completely dominated by human will and intent. Indeed, there are two components of this probability: the probability someone will attempt to divert a technology, and the probability they will succeed in doing so. In practice, advocates of the "proliferation risk" vocabulary typically assume the magnitude of the first "probability" is unity (1.0), and then move on to the rest of the story – often without any useful definition of the chain of events under consideration.
It is true some technologies are easier to divert for clandestine purposes that others. And it is possible to build technical barriers and "self-reporting" technologies into nuclear fuels, reactors, and reprocessing facilities. But given an infinitely evil, infinitely rich, infinitely intelligent, and infinitely wealthy adversary, it's probably impossible to design a system that is "proliferation-proof". (And of course, the other challenge is that many of the technologies that enhance the proliferation resistance of nuclear technologies also make them more expensive for legitimate energy production purposes.)
So, enough musings for this posting. The topic of nuclear power and proliferation is very complicated, and men and women of good will can disagree strongly on many aspects of the debate.
Cheers...
Saturday, November 27, 2010
Post # 23: Sustainable Coal ?
Sustainable coal? Clean coal? King Coal !
The December issue of The Atlantic magazine has an interesting and challenging article ( http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/12/dirty-coal-clean-future/8307/ ) that I find at once accurate, balanced, troubling, and angering. The article is by global- and (especially) China-watcher, James Fallows. Fallows begins by reviewing the consensus facts regarding the current and recent trend in global carbon emissions (37 billion tons of carbon dioxide per year) and atmospheric carbon dioxide levels (~ 280 ppm). He next shifts to giving a high-level factual account of the role coal plays in U.S. world-wide energy production. (Coal-fired power plants are responsible for ~ 46% of the total U.S. electricity production.)
He then states what should be obvious to almost everyone: the role that coal plays in global energy production is unlikely to change dramatically over the next several decades regardless of the onward-march of technology in the energy conservation, renewable energy, and nuclear energy arenas. This because there is so much of it, it is relatively cheap, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future regardless of rather feeble (to date) attempts by various entities to internalize the external costs of the black commodity.
Next is a quick review of the options for cleaning-up coal: burn it more cleanly, and capture the carbon after it is burned but before it is released to the atmosphere. Nothing new here.
Fallows now turns to the element of the article I find most encouraging and at once, most frustrating... the fact that governments around the world (particularly in the West) are failing to make significant advances in improving coal technology because they are no longer places were "doing is done". We aren't building new power plants in the U.S. Thus the U.S. isn't a viable test and demonstration platform for new technologies. Fortunately, China is such a place.
Lastly, a hopeful element to the article... businesses are doing what governments can't seem to pull-off. "B-to-B" alliances are forming between the U.S. and China, that are beginning to have impact in the deployment of improved energy technologies. New technologies are being deployed in China, and U.S. businesses are learning lessons they cannot learn in the U.S. because we aren't building anything here. Fallows highlights Duke Energy Company in Charlotte as a forward-looking company who has become a leader in U.S. engagement in "the doings" in China.
Congratulates to Duke Energy. Let's hope more companies will follow suite...
Sherrell
The December issue of The Atlantic magazine has an interesting and challenging article ( http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/12/dirty-coal-clean-future/8307/ ) that I find at once accurate, balanced, troubling, and angering. The article is by global- and (especially) China-watcher, James Fallows. Fallows begins by reviewing the consensus facts regarding the current and recent trend in global carbon emissions (37 billion tons of carbon dioxide per year) and atmospheric carbon dioxide levels (~ 280 ppm). He next shifts to giving a high-level factual account of the role coal plays in U.S. world-wide energy production. (Coal-fired power plants are responsible for ~ 46% of the total U.S. electricity production.)
He then states what should be obvious to almost everyone: the role that coal plays in global energy production is unlikely to change dramatically over the next several decades regardless of the onward-march of technology in the energy conservation, renewable energy, and nuclear energy arenas. This because there is so much of it, it is relatively cheap, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future regardless of rather feeble (to date) attempts by various entities to internalize the external costs of the black commodity.
Next is a quick review of the options for cleaning-up coal: burn it more cleanly, and capture the carbon after it is burned but before it is released to the atmosphere. Nothing new here.
Fallows now turns to the element of the article I find most encouraging and at once, most frustrating... the fact that governments around the world (particularly in the West) are failing to make significant advances in improving coal technology because they are no longer places were "doing is done". We aren't building new power plants in the U.S. Thus the U.S. isn't a viable test and demonstration platform for new technologies. Fortunately, China is such a place.
Lastly, a hopeful element to the article... businesses are doing what governments can't seem to pull-off. "B-to-B" alliances are forming between the U.S. and China, that are beginning to have impact in the deployment of improved energy technologies. New technologies are being deployed in China, and U.S. businesses are learning lessons they cannot learn in the U.S. because we aren't building anything here. Fallows highlights Duke Energy Company in Charlotte as a forward-looking company who has become a leader in U.S. engagement in "the doings" in China.
Congratulates to Duke Energy. Let's hope more companies will follow suite...
Sherrell
Saturday, October 30, 2010
Post # 22: Imperative 4 – Achieving Sustainable Nuclear Fuel Cycles
The fourth Nuclear Energy Imperative has to do with achieving sustainable fuel cycles.
First, let me address my view of the definition of "sustainable". This actually is not a simple matter. Many definitions have been offered and there's endless debate about the meaning of this term. To me, something is sustainable if it does not exhaust fundamental natural resource limits and conveys benefits now and to future generations commensurate with it's costs (economical, environmental, social/cultural). Sustainability is a benefit/cost issue. Inter-generational equity is a critical consideration. Thus, there is also the question of the timeframe over which one performs this assessment. Is it 100 years, 1000 years, 10,000 years, "forever" ? From a practical standpoint, given the limits of human knowledge and the progressive nature of science and technology, I tend to adopt the "few hundred years" timeframe for my consideration of such matters. So let's pick 300 years as the time frame for our analysis. That's roughly ten human generations.
Second, it's important to have a context for the amount (volume) of spent nuclear fuel currently generated by the nuclear power industry. As I've noted before, a single 1 Gigawatt electric nuclear power plant produces about 20 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel a year. That's about forty or so nuclear fuel assemblies for pressurized water reactors. The entire of inventory of spent nuclear fuel generated in the U.S. today by every commercial nuclear power plant that has every operated can fit in a spent fuel pool less than 300 feet on a side. (We are NOT generating mountains of spent nuclear fuel in this country.)
My definition of a "sustainable nuclear fuel cycle" is encompassed by five criteria which I term my:
So what is my proposed solution? I believe the "solution" is to develop a nuclear fuel cycle (a suite of reactors, nuclear fuels, and nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies) that achieve my Five Pillars with the added specificity that the time frame for application in Pillar # 4 is 300 years (again ~ 10 generations). I'm not the only one thinking this way. Dr. Kathryn Jackson's testimony before the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future this past August promoted a similar view from a leader in the nuclear industry. Dr. Jackson is Westinghouse Nuclear's Senior Vice President and Technology Officer.
As I said, there's much more here to be discussed. But for now, let's think about the Five Pillars of a Sustainable Fuel Cycle, and the Five Imperatives of Nuclear Energy as a framework for workable nuclear energy future – here and abroad.
First, let me address my view of the definition of "sustainable". This actually is not a simple matter. Many definitions have been offered and there's endless debate about the meaning of this term. To me, something is sustainable if it does not exhaust fundamental natural resource limits and conveys benefits now and to future generations commensurate with it's costs (economical, environmental, social/cultural). Sustainability is a benefit/cost issue. Inter-generational equity is a critical consideration. Thus, there is also the question of the timeframe over which one performs this assessment. Is it 100 years, 1000 years, 10,000 years, "forever" ? From a practical standpoint, given the limits of human knowledge and the progressive nature of science and technology, I tend to adopt the "few hundred years" timeframe for my consideration of such matters. So let's pick 300 years as the time frame for our analysis. That's roughly ten human generations.
Second, it's important to have a context for the amount (volume) of spent nuclear fuel currently generated by the nuclear power industry. As I've noted before, a single 1 Gigawatt electric nuclear power plant produces about 20 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel a year. That's about forty or so nuclear fuel assemblies for pressurized water reactors. The entire of inventory of spent nuclear fuel generated in the U.S. today by every commercial nuclear power plant that has every operated can fit in a spent fuel pool less than 300 feet on a side. (We are NOT generating mountains of spent nuclear fuel in this country.)
My definition of a "sustainable nuclear fuel cycle" is encompassed by five criteria which I term my:
"Five Pillars of a Sustainable Nuclear Fuel Cycle":
- known uranium resources would support it's deployment for at least 300 years (300 years from above definition of sustainability);
- it would be "affordable" and economically competitive to nuclear power produces and energy consumers;
- it would not create unacceptable quantities (volumes) of nuclear waste;
- the radiotoxicity (health risks) of the spent nuclear fuel and fuel cycle wastes would drop to levels similar to that of uranium in the earth's crust after a relatively short period of time which is meaningful in terms of human social, cultural, and government structures;
- its deployment would not present unacceptable dangers from the standpoint of nuclear proliferation.
An exhaustive analysis of these issues is well beyond the scope of a blog posting, and much research has been done and is currently underway around the world today. So just a few comments here...
The amount of uranium "economically" recoverable (Pillar 1) is a matter of some debate and uncertainty. However, given current projections for world-wide growth in nuclear power, it appears we have or will have access to uranium reserves sufficient for somewhere between 100 and 300 years even if the current once-through open fuel cycle continues to be used. So, from the resource utilization standpoint, the current once-through fuel cycle isn't sustainable. Additionally, the current fuel cycle creates wastes (that violate my Pillar 4 above. So the current open fuel cycle is not sustainable and must eventually be replaced. However, we clearly have some time to land upon the solution. (See MIT's recent update of their 2009 fuel cycle study.
So what is my proposed solution? I believe the "solution" is to develop a nuclear fuel cycle (a suite of reactors, nuclear fuels, and nuclear fuel reprocessing technologies) that achieve my Five Pillars with the added specificity that the time frame for application in Pillar # 4 is 300 years (again ~ 10 generations). I'm not the only one thinking this way. Dr. Kathryn Jackson's testimony before the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future this past August promoted a similar view from a leader in the nuclear industry. Dr. Jackson is Westinghouse Nuclear's Senior Vice President and Technology Officer.
As I said, there's much more here to be discussed. But for now, let's think about the Five Pillars of a Sustainable Fuel Cycle, and the Five Imperatives of Nuclear Energy as a framework for workable nuclear energy future – here and abroad.
More on the proliferation issue (Imperative 5) soon...
Cheers !
Sherrell
Colossians 1:17
Saturday, September 18, 2010
Post # 21: Imperative 3 – Enable the transition away from fossil fuels
Today, approximately 40% of our nation's carbon emissions stem from the use of fossil fuels in the transportation sector (principally liquid fuels production and consumption), and industrial sector (principally fossil-derived process heat production). Indeed, my own model indicates that even if we completely decarbonized our electricity production, by mid century our total national carbon emissions would drop by less than 25%!
Imagine that! If not one kilogram of carbon dioxide was released in the production of electricity in 2050, we still would only achieve modest reductions in overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Why? If the population continues to grow at a modest 0.6% per annum, and all these people still drive automobiles, and we still move freight across our country in the same manner, and still provide process heat to our factories in the same manner, we are only addressing 60% of the problem when we focus on electricity production and use.
Improvements in the efficiency of production and use of electricity are already effectively accounted for in my simple analysis. So, the only way to further improve our lot and achieve more-sizable reductions in our GHG emissions is to transform the transportation and process heat sectors. We must reduce the consumption of petroleum in our vehicles and the use of oil, coal, and natural gas for production of industrial process heat.
Thus the challenged posed by President Obama's goal of an 80% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is daunting - to say the least. In fact, I feel confident in saying the Administration's goals for greenhouse gas emissions reductions are virtually impossible without a revolutionary change in our society.
There are many who believe these energy challenges will drive almost unimaginable changes in population distribution. Interestingly, opposing arguments can be made with regard to the direction of these changes. Some who have studied this issue believe we will see a massive centralization of our population in urban centers to reduce the transportation costs and petroleum consumption associated with daily commutes to work. Others feel the opposite will happen – that things will become so dire, our socio-economic infrastructure will collapse, resulting in a return to an agrarian economy. This belief is normally associated with the assumption there would be a mass exodus from population centers into the suburbs and country side.
There is another solution with five ingredients:
Imagine that! If not one kilogram of carbon dioxide was released in the production of electricity in 2050, we still would only achieve modest reductions in overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Why? If the population continues to grow at a modest 0.6% per annum, and all these people still drive automobiles, and we still move freight across our country in the same manner, and still provide process heat to our factories in the same manner, we are only addressing 60% of the problem when we focus on electricity production and use.
Improvements in the efficiency of production and use of electricity are already effectively accounted for in my simple analysis. So, the only way to further improve our lot and achieve more-sizable reductions in our GHG emissions is to transform the transportation and process heat sectors. We must reduce the consumption of petroleum in our vehicles and the use of oil, coal, and natural gas for production of industrial process heat.
Thus the challenged posed by President Obama's goal of an 80% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is daunting - to say the least. In fact, I feel confident in saying the Administration's goals for greenhouse gas emissions reductions are virtually impossible without a revolutionary change in our society.
There are many who believe these energy challenges will drive almost unimaginable changes in population distribution. Interestingly, opposing arguments can be made with regard to the direction of these changes. Some who have studied this issue believe we will see a massive centralization of our population in urban centers to reduce the transportation costs and petroleum consumption associated with daily commutes to work. Others feel the opposite will happen – that things will become so dire, our socio-economic infrastructure will collapse, resulting in a return to an agrarian economy. This belief is normally associated with the assumption there would be a mass exodus from population centers into the suburbs and country side.
There is another solution with five ingredients:
- Electrification of the private vehicle and over-road freight transportation sectors (probably requires a major breakthrough in battery technology);
- Switching to synthetic fuels where vehicle electrification is not possible;
- Switching away from fossil-derived process heat in industrial sectors (especially the petro-chemical sector);
- Increasing the size of the nuclear electric power plant fleet and improving the electric grid as necessary to deliver the electricity required for # 1; and
- Developing and deploying a new generation of high-temperature and very-high-temperature nuclear reactors to provide the process heat needed to enable # 2 and #3.
This "simple" formula – electrify the transportation sector and produce the electricity with nuclear power plants, and switch to nuclear-derived process heat across our major industrial sectors – would enable the continuation of life as we know it in the western world. I am not aware of another strategy that is as practical and easily implemented as this approach. Frankly, absent this approach, or something very similar to it, things look pretty grim...
Just thinking...
Sherrell
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Post # 20: Imperative 2 - Improving the affordability of nuclear energy
The second of the "Five Imperatives of Nuclear Energy" is: we must improve the affordability of nuclear energy and nuclear power plants. I'll discuss that today...
Once the construction cost of a nuclear power plant is fully amortized (ie., the "construction loan" for the plant is paid-off), nuclear power plants produce extremely cheap electricity. The typical cost of electricity production in today's nuclear fleet is less that 3 cents per kilowatt-hr of electricity produced. In my part of the country (TVA service area), residential electricity sells for about 8 cents per kilowatt-hr – cheap by national standards. Since most plants are "paid-off" within twenty years, nuclear power plants that are more than about 20 years old are tremendous revenue producers for their owners (you and me if we happen to own stock in a company who owns and operates such a plant), and a source of very affordable electricity for their customers (again... you and me).
While the details of the affordability issue can be complex, at a high-level these issues reduce to three primary factors that have driven the purchase cost of modern nuclear power plants out of the "affordable" range for many prospective buyers:
The solutions to these challenges ?
Once the construction cost of a nuclear power plant is fully amortized (ie., the "construction loan" for the plant is paid-off), nuclear power plants produce extremely cheap electricity. The typical cost of electricity production in today's nuclear fleet is less that 3 cents per kilowatt-hr of electricity produced. In my part of the country (TVA service area), residential electricity sells for about 8 cents per kilowatt-hr – cheap by national standards. Since most plants are "paid-off" within twenty years, nuclear power plants that are more than about 20 years old are tremendous revenue producers for their owners (you and me if we happen to own stock in a company who owns and operates such a plant), and a source of very affordable electricity for their customers (again... you and me).
While the details of the affordability issue can be complex, at a high-level these issues reduce to three primary factors that have driven the purchase cost of modern nuclear power plants out of the "affordable" range for many prospective buyers:
- Todays plants are large (typically greater than 1 GWe in size). Due to "economy of scale" considerations, the nuclear industry evolved to a "one size fits all" mentality in which the one size was a hugh plant. Too bad if you really didn't need all of that electricity production capability in one incremental addition.
- Like all large, complex facilities, these large plants require vast quantities of steel, concrete, wire, and other construction materials, along with extensive labor to design and build the plants. Capital cost estimates for current large plant models range from around $4000 per kWe to as high as $8000 per kWe for a complete plant that is fully-integrated into the utility's electric grid. That's $4-8 BILLION dollars for a single nuclear power plant. Not something you're apt to find in Walmart!
- The time period required to build, license, and commission our most recent nuclear plants (7-10 years) resulted in high finance charges for the capital the utilities had to borrowed to purchase the plants. This protracted time period was in large-part the artifact of an inefficient licensing process that, in practice, made it extremely difficult to predict when a plant would be allowed to start operations and how much finance charges the owner would have to pay in the interim. Neither financiers or owners liked that situation.
The solutions to these challenges ?
- One of the most exciting developments in this regard is the mushrooming interest in small modular reactors (SMRs). These plants, ranging in size from as little as 10 MWe to around 300 MWe, would significantly reduce the "single purchase" cost of plant due simply to their small size. Additionally, many of these plants have features that should enable more automated fabrication and construction, offering the potential to reap the benefits of high-volume "factory fabrication"and simplified field installation.
- During the past several years, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has reformed and modified it's design certification and plant licensing process. While maintaining a sharp focus on assuring the safety of new plants, the reformed process should provide a more predictable and accelerated licensing process compared to that experienced in the last several plants built in the U.S. twenty-some years ago.
While there are a number of other relevant factors and dynamics in play, the advent of small nuclear power plant options, and (hopefully) a more reliable licensing process, should go a long way toward achieving Imperative 2.
Next time, Imperative 3.
Cheers,
Sherrell, Col 1:17
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
Post # 19: Imperative 1: The Anchor of a Sustainable Energy Future
In Post #18, I introduced the concept of the Five Imperatives of Nuclear Energy. Briefly, these Five Imperatives are:
- Extend the life, improve the performance, and sustain the health and safety of the current commercial nuclear power fleet;
- Improve the affordability of nuclear energy;
- Enable the transition away from fossil fuels in the transportation and industrial sectors;
- Achieve sustainable nuclear fuel cycles;
- Assure the deployment of nuclear power systems does not result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Today I will briefly discuss Imperative 1.
Every year since 2005, the U.S. commercial nuclear fleet of 104 operating reactors has produced approximately 4 billion megawatt hours of ultra-low-carbon electricity . This is 70% of our nation's low-carbon electricity. According to statistics from the Nuclear Energy Institute, the U.S. nuclear fleet provided this energy while enabling us to avoid the annual production and release of ~ 52 million short tons of sulfur dioxide, 20 million short tons of nitrogen oxides, and 647 million metric tons of carbon dioxide that would have been released into the environment had the same amount of electricity been produced by fossil-fueled power plants in the regions where the plants operate. In exchange for the electricity produced, the fleet produced approximately 2200 metric tons of used nuclear fuel. This amounts to around 4400 fuel assemblies, each 12-14 feet long and about 8 inches square - not a large volume of "waste" for the tremendous amount of low-carbon electricity provided. It would all fit into a box 15 feet high by 67 feet on a side if stored as we store used fuel today.
Every credible low-carbon energy scenario I have seen depends on and is anchored by the assumption our current nuclear fleet continues to operate well past the original 40 yr. license period of the reactors. I'm convinced significant reductions in our carbon emissions rates are impossible unless we maintain the health and extend the operational lifetimes of these workhorses of clean energy, and supplement them with as much wind and solar energy we can produce.
Thankfully, at this point, 59 of the 104 operating U.S. nuclear power plants have been grated 20-year license extensions, 20 additional units have filed applications for a license extension, and 19 additional units have indicated they will file for a license extension (total = 98 units).
The next question is, "how long can these plants continue to safely operate?" The U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Industry are currently partnered in an R&D program called, the "Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, which has among its goals the development of the science-based understanding of plant aging required to answer this question. In addition, DOE recently awarded its Nuclear Energy Modeling and Simulation Innovation Hub to the Consortia for Advanced Simulation of LWRs (or "CASL") – a team led by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. CASL has among its goals the development of a "virtual reactor" as a tool for exploration of many reactor performance and aging phenomena.
So... it's a good news story... Our commercial nuclear fleet currently operates at over 90% average availability, with a stellar safety record. It's the anchor of any realistic low-carbon energy production future. The fleet's operating life is being extended from the original 40 years to 60 years, and intensive research is underway to allow us to maximize the safe operating lifetimes of the low-carbon work horses.
We'll discuss the other Imperatives in future posts.
Cheers,
Sherrell
Colossians 1:17
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