Post # 73: The Canary, The Ostrich, and The Black Swan

November is an important month for those interested in the nuclear power industry's response to the March 2011 accident at  Fukushima Dai ichi.  The  American Nuclear Society's Winter Meeting will be the setting for the embedded "International Meeting on Severe Accident Assessment and Management: Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi".  This four-day event will bring together experts from around the world to discuss the current status of the Fukushima Dai ichi plants, what we have learned / are learning from Fukushima, and plans for future activities related to Fukushima.  Specific topics to be covered include: severe accident phenomenology, severe accident sequence progression, severe accident management and mitigation strategies, severe accident simulation, and a number of other very relevant topics.

On Monday afternoon, Nov. 12, I will be presenting my recently-completed paper entitled, "The Canary, the Ostrich, and the Black Swan: An Historical Perspective on Our Understanding of BWR Severe Accidents and Their Mitigation."  This twenty-two page paper (with some 65 technical references) is my attempt to chronicle the evolution of our knowledge of commercial boiling water reactor severe accidents since the landmark Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) in 1975.  Here's the abstract of the paper...

" Between 1980 and 1995, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) was engaged in an intense effort to understand commercial boiling water reactor (BWR) severe accident phenomenology, severe accident progression, and the potential role of the reactor operator in severe accident mitigation. This paper presents a summary of the major findings and conclusions from that period. Both detailed accident- and plant-specific results are discussed.  The author, who was a member of the ORNL research team who performed the work, offers an historical perspective on lessons learned, lessons ignored, and lessons forgotten from that period. The relevancy of these findings in the post-Fukushima world is addressed.  Finally, the author discusses the evolution of the current risk-informed regulatory framework; and identifies some key questions to be addressed, and critical steps to be taken to inform the development of the new nuclear safety construct required in the wake of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident." 

The title of the paper is, as you might guess, is inspired by the peculiar characteristics of three birds:

The Canary – which once served as an "early warning system" to miners of dangerous conditions associated with carbon monoxide and other dangerous gases;

The Ostrich – which is (incorrectly) known for sticking its head in the sand to avoid obvious imminent danger; and

The Black Swan – the symbol adopted in recent times for a major event which is deemed a surprise to virtually everyone when it occurs, but after its occurrence, is viewed as something that could/should have been expected or predicted.

The paper was motivated by my conviction that accidents like that which occurred at Fukushima Dai ichi are unacceptable (regardless of their cause) and preventable – if the nuclear industry truly commits itself to going beyond the expedient in it's response to the accident.

The full paper will be published in the Proceedings of the meeting and available on CD-ROM at the meeting and thereafter from the ANS. 

Post # 72: NTTF Recommendation 2

Earthquakes and Floods

 Available evidence now indicates that even though the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 was estimated to be a magnitude 9.0 earthquake (exceeding the design basis of the Fukushima Dai ichi plant), the direct damage to the plant from the quake was minor compared to that resulting from the large tsunami that struck the plant some 40 minutes later.  (The plant was designed to weather an 8 meter high tsunami wave.  However, the maximum height of the waves that struct the plant exceeded 14 meters.)  The wave impact damage and the flooding resulting from the multi-tsunami waves that struck the plant accounted for the majority of the damage that lead directly to the ensuing station blackout and, ultimately, to the severe accident. 

And if the Fukushima experience was not sufficient to spawn an international re-look at commercial nuclear power plant vulnerability to seismic and flooding events, the urgency of the matter was heightened in June 2011 due to the partial flooding of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station in Fort Calhoun, Nebraska.  That event occurred due to historic flooding of the Missouri River following heavy rain falls and rapid snowpack melting in the Rocky Mountains. (The Fort Calhoun station is still shutdown.)

It was with all of the above as background that the NRC's July 2011 Near Term Task Force (NTTF) report presented Recommendation 2:

NTTF Recommendation 2

The Task Force recommends that the NRC require licensees to reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the design-basis seismic and flooding protection of SSCs for each operating reactor. 

This overall recommendations was further expanded in the NTTF report ...

The Task Force recommends that the Commission direct the following actions to ensure adequate protection from natural phenomena, consistent with the current state of knowledge and analytical methods. These should be undertaken to prevent fuel damage and to ensure containment and spent fuel pool integrity:

2.1 Order licensees to reevaluate the seismic and flooding hazards at their sites against current NRC requirements and guidance, and if necessary, update the design basis and SSCs important to safety to protect against the updated hazards.

2.2 Initiate rulemaking to require licensees to confirm seismic hazards and flooding hazards every 10 years and address any new and significant information. If necessary, update the design basis for SSCs important to safety to protect against the updated hazards.

2.3 Order licensees to perform seismic and flood protection walkdowns to identify and address plant-specific vulnerabilities and verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance for protection features such as watertight barriers and seals in the interim period until longer term actions are completed to update the design basis for external events.

The term "SSC" in the above language refers to structures, systems, and components – the basic building blocks of a nuclear power plant.  The basic idea behind Recommendations 2.1-2.3 is to ensure that (regardless of the original seismic and flooding design basis for a commercial nuclear power plant) the most current and accurate data, information, and methods are used to re-examine the plant's vulnerability to such events.

Subsequent Actions Relevant to Recommendations 2.1 & 2.3

In October 2011, Recommendations 2.1 and 2.3  were designated in SECY-11-0137 as "Tier-1" recommendations – "... recommendations which the staff determined should be started without unnecessary delay and for which sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of critical skill sets, exists."

The NRC subsequently issued a Request for Information (the so-called "50.54(f) Generic Letter) to its nuclear power plant licensees on March 12, 2012.  The letter requested a two-phase re-evaluation of seismic and flooding hazards at each plant.  (The letter also addressed Recommendation 9.3, but I'll discuss that in a future posting.)   The Phase I re-evaluation was to consist of a re-look at the seismic and floods hazards at each plant based on the latest seismic and flooding hazard information (expected frequency and magnitude of potential earthquakes and floods) and present-day regulatory guidance and methodologies for evaluation of these hazards.  The NRC noted in the request that the Phase I evaluations would not revise the design basis of the plant (the technical analysis under which it was originally licensed).  Phase II of the hazards evaluation will follow after the NRC reviews the Phase I analyses and decides what, if any, regulatory actions (including plant and procedure modifications) will be required.   The Generic Letter, together with its enclosures and attachments, spell out in great detail the precise nature of the information each licensee is to provide the NRC.  Each licensee has 1.5 years to submit a comprehensive written response to the re-evaluation request.

But the NRC doesn't intend to sit on its hands for 1.5 years while it awaits the licensees' response to the Phase I / Phase II re-evaluation information request.  In addition to the information discussed above, the Generic Letter also requested that each licensee conduct seismic and flooding "walkdowns" to "identify and address plant specific degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and verify the adequacy of strategies, monitoring, and maintenance programs such that the nuclear power plant can respond to external events."  Licensees were given 120 days to confirm their intent to use an NRC-endorsed walkdown procedure or to provide a description of their preferred walkdown process.  Following NRC's approval of the licensee's 120-day submittal, each licensee was afforded another 180 days to complete the walkdowns and submit their results to the NRC.  Thus all the walkdowns are to be complete and their results submitted to the NRC no later than 300 days from March 12, 2012 – or January 2013.

In the months since the March 2012 release of the Generic Letter, the nuclear power industry has devoted tremendous effort to excuting the requested walkdowns and documenting their results.  (The Generic Letter noted that the NRC had estimated each licensee would expend 13,300 hr of effort to conduct their evaluations and prepare their response.)

So we are coming to the end of the allotted time for execution of the requested seismic and flooding walkdowns and submission of the results.  In addition, the licensees are preparing for the Phase I hazards analysis.  And if that is not taxing enough, many plants are undergoing their regularly-scheduled refueling and maintenance outages in the coming weeks and remaining months of 2012.

Bottom line... the accident at Fukushima has spawned a wholesale re-examination of the ability of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants to withstand extreme seismic and flooding events.  While some important near-term actions are coming to completion, significant efforts will be expended by the NRC and the Industry over the next couple of years to more fully comply with NTTF Recommendation 2.

Post # 71: NTTF Recommendation 1

So let's dig in to the NRC's Near Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendations as documented in the NTTF Report:

Recommendation 1.  "The Task Force recommends establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.

1.1 Draft a Commission policy statement that articulates a risk-informed defense-in-depth framework that includes extended design-basis requirements in the NRC's regulations as essential elements for ensuring adequate protection

1.2 Initiate rulemaking to implement a risk-informed, defense-in-depth framework consistent with the above recommended Commission policy statement.

1.3 Modify the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines to more effectively implement the defense-in-depth philosophy in balance with the current emphasis on risk-based guidelines.  The Task Force beleives that the Regulatory Analysis Guidelines could be modified by implementing some of the concepts presented in the technology-neutral framework (NUREG-1860) to better integrate safety goals and defense-in-depth.

1.4 Evaluate the insights from the IPE and IPEEE efforts as summarized in NUREG-1560, "Individual Plant Examination Program: Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance," issued December 1997, and NUREG-1742, "Perspectives Gained from the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Program, " issued April 2002, to identify potential generic regulations or plant-specific regulatory requirements."

There's a lot nuclear safety and NRC jargon in the text I just quoted from the NTTF report.  I could spend several posts drilling down into the nuances of these recommendations and their potential implications.  Of all the recommendations presented by the NTTF, this is the one that has the greatest potential long-term impact for the commercial nuclear power industry.  I think of it as the "Super Recommendation"  I'll limit myself here to what I consider to be the most important high-level implication of Recommendation 1: Increased uncertainty and angst in the commercial power industry...

While Recommendation 1 and its sub-recommendations do not go so far as to state the current U.S. NRC regulatory framework is fatally flawed, the recommendation clearly communicates the NTTF's position that the current regulatory framework does not adequately integrate traditional deterministic reactor safety design approach (such as the use of design basis accidents, Design Criteria, "defense-in-depth", etc.) and the risk-based or probabilistic safety considerations (core melt probability, large early release LER probabilities, expected public health impacts, etc.) that have evolved in the post-TMI-2 era.

This challenge is not new.  During the past twenty years, the NRC has evolved toward increased usage of risk-based criteria in the examination of the requirement of plant backfits, conduct of plant maintenance, and in the articulation of risk-based safety-goals. Still it is the fact that the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi did NOT violate current NRC public safety goals (because they are expressed solely in terms of expected public fatalities as a direct result of an accident, and there were no such fatalities at Fukushima). This fact obviously raises the question of whether the NRC's currently risk-based public safety goals are sufficiently comprehensive to protect society from Fukushima-like accidents.  (For instance, many individuals from within and outside of the nuclear industry are now advocating the addition of additional risk-based public impact criteria – such as land contamination.)

The NRC staff is currently considering Recommendation 1 and options for response to it.  We have been told to expect a "SECY" paper early in calendar year 2013.  That paper will  provide an initial roadmap for a (no-doubt long-term) re-examination and revision of the fundamental regulatory framework of commercial nuclear power plants in the U.S.

The potential implications of Recommendation 1 are huge.  The fundamental design of future nuclear power plants, the siting options and policies for new nuclear power plants, and the day-to-day operations of existing and future nuclear power plants might be affected in ways we cannot predict at this moment.

All of this comes, of course, at a time when the nuclear industry is laboring mightily to respond to the suite of "Tier-1" recommendations the NRC identified in SECY-11-0124 as requiring immediate or near-term action.   I'll talk more about Tier-1 recommendations in my next post.

Cheers,
Sherrell

Post # 70: The Structure of the U.S. Fukushima Response

With this post I begin the promised series in which I hope to provide a structured and concise chronicle of the U.S. nuclear industry's ongoing response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident and the the evolving "lessons-learned" from it.

In the wake of the Fukushima Dai-ichi incident, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) convened a "Near-Term Task Force" or "NTTF" to examine the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi and offer recommendations regarding actions the NRC should take to enhance commercial nuclear power safety in the U.S. in the light of evolving lessons learned from the event.  The NTTF report,   "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century – the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," (SECY-11-0093, 12 July 2011) concluded there was imminent danger from continued operation of U.S. nuclear power plants, but did present "Twelve Recommendations" for actions the NRC and its licensees should take to further enhance the safety of commercial nuclear power.  

Following issuance of the NTTF report, the NRC Commission asked (SRM-SECY-11-0093) the NRC Staff to examine the NTTF's Twelve Recommendations, and to prioritize them in a logical manner based on the urgency of required actions, and the inter-relationships and inter-dependencies of the various issues.  The NRC Staff's initial recommendations regarding the subset of actions requiring the most urgent action were presented in SECY-11-0124.  Subsequently,  SECY-11-0137 presented the NRC Staff's recommendations for a three-tired prioritization.  This three-tiered hierarchy was accepted by the NRC Commissioners, and became the organizational foundation of the U.S. response to the accident at Fukushima.

Before I continue, I should point out that, as NRC Chairman Macfarlane said a few days ago in her remarks at the IAEA in Vienna, the current structure of the NRC's and the Industry's response to Fukushima is likely to evolve away from the simple "12 Recommendations" approach presented in the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report.  Here are Chairman Macfarlane's words,

" As we move forward in the evolution of our nuclear safety culture, we must address the fact that the majority of post-Fukushima activities were placed in special categories. In the period immediately following Fukushima, this approach made the most sense. In the United States, for example, we established a task force to address the impacts of the accident on our domestic program, and then a special Fukushima-related directorate to implement the ensuing recommendations. The NRC is now beginning to transition these Fukushima lessons-learned programs from special, segregated actions back to the offices that handle these matters on a routine basis. Far from minimizing these activities’ importance, this approach will ensure that the lessons we have learned are fully integrated into our regulatory work in the United States. We believe that by weaving the lessons learned from Fukushima into nearly all of our regulatory activities, we are ensuring their long-term sustainability, and encourage our international colleagues to do the same." 

So... now for the Twelve Recommendations as presented in SECY-11-0093....

1. The Task Force recommends establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations

2. The Task Force recommends that the NRC require licenses to reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the design-basis seismic and flooding protection of structures, systems, and components for each operating reactor

3. The Task Force recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC evaluate potential enhancements to the capability to prevent for mitigate seismically induced fires and floods

4. The Task Force recommends that the NRC strengthen station blackout mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events

5. The Task Force recommends requiring reliable hardened vent designs in boiling water reactor facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments

6. The Task Force recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident

7. The Task Force recommends enhancing spent file pool makeup capability and instrumentation for the spent fuel pool.

8. The Task Force recommends strengthening and integrating onsite emergency response capabilities such as emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines, and extensive damage mitigation guidelines.

9. The Task Force recommends that the NRC require that facility emergency plans address prolonged station blackout and multiunit events.

10. The Task Force recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC pursue additional emergency preparedness topics related to multiunit events and prolonged station blackout.

11. The Task Force recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC should pursue emergency preparedness topics related to decision making, radiation monitoring, and public education.

12. The Task Force recommends that the NRC strengthen regulatory oversight of licensee safety performance (i.e., the Reactor Oversight Process) by focusing more attention on defense-in-depth requirements consistent with the recommended defense-in-depth framework.

Things are a bit more complicated than this simple list, because each of the Twelve Recommendations (except for # 3)  were parsed into two or more sub-recommendations (e.g. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4).   Those seeking to monitor U.S. progress in addressing the Twelve Recommendations find their task complicated further because the three-tier prioritization of the Twelve Recommendations was done at the sub-recommendation level rather than at the top level. Thus, Recommendation 5.1 is a Tier-1 priority, while Recommendation 5.2 is a Tier-3 priority.

I will end this post here.  Future posts will discuss the sub-recommendations for each of the Twelve Recommendations, the prioritization of the sub-recommendations, actions taken to date by the U.S. NRC and the nuclear industry to address each sub-recommendation, future directions for continued progress, etc.

Again, my goal in this series of posts is not to provide an exhaustive review of all the safety-related activities in the industry.  I'm simply attempting to "status" U.S. progress in the key areas identified by the NTTF in a structured, clear, and simple manner that enables the non-expert to understand and track the post-Fukushima evolution of U.S. commercial nuclear power safety.

Cheers!
Sherrell

Post # 69: Monitoring the U.S. Response To Fukushima

This blog is about sustainable energy.  Over the past couple of years I've discussed a wide variety of topics that relate to sustainable energy production and use.  I've frequently noted my conviction that nuclear energy has to be the foundation of any sustainable AND ABUNDANT energy future for this small blue planet.

Those of you who have followed me here for any length of time also know I've spent much of my career in the nuclear reactor safety arena.  More specifically, I spent many years working with my colleagues at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), the other national laboratories, and the commercial nuclear industry to improve our understanding of severe accident phenomenology, severe accident progression, and severe accident management strategies in commercial boiling water reactors (BWRs).  Along with all of you, I was deeply saddened by the events of March 2011 in Japan and at the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant.   Several of my previous blogs have dealt with BWR severe accident phenomenology and the events at Fukushima.

As you can imagine, I am closely following the post-Fukushima response of the global commercial nuclear industry and regulatory agencies worldwide.  In fact, at EnergX, we're part of that response.  We've assembled an incredibly talented team of nuclear reactor safety and risk experts – some of whom have been heavily involved in the beyond-design-basis accident and severe accident research and regulatory arenas for over forty years (predating the 1975 Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).  Members of our team were on-site during and following the accidents at TMI-2 and Chernobyl.  They served on the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), and they led both industry and national laboratory research efforts for the decades following these accidents.  And, like some of you, our team is engaged in the industry's effort to learn from and respond to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

So it is with this background I've decided to initiate a series of updates here to discuss the status of the U.S. industry's and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's response to Fukushima Dai-ichi.  I will attempt to strike a balance between technical detail and clarity so that you do not have to be a nuclear engineer, or a nuclear regulatory expert to following along.  My goal in doing this is not to be an evangelist for the nuclear industry.  The industry needs no evangelist.  Rather, my goal is to chronicle as accurately and clearly as possible how the events at Fukushima are changing the present and the future of nuclear power in the U.S. and abroad.

So visit me regularly in the coming weeks and months to following the unfolding story of how the U.S. commercial nuclear power sector is learning from, and responding to the events at Fukushima.

Oh... and not to worry... I don't plan to entirely abandon the broader sustainable energy topic.  I will continue to post on non-Fukushima and non-nuclear energy matters as my interests and evolving events warrant.

Cheers,

Sherrell

Post # 68: Update From the ANS Utility Working Conference

I just returned from the American Nuclear Society's Utility Working Conference in Hollywood, Florida.  This 3-day annual event is focused on the commercial nuclear power industry and the needs of the commercial nuclear power plant owner/operators.  My wife, Rebecca (who is a mechanical engineer) and I staffed the EnergX booth at the vendor's exhibition.

As you might imagine, several of this year's working sessions spotlighted, the evolving industry response to the accident at Fukushima Dai ichi.

Based on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's early implementation actions on the Near Term Task Force's twelve recommendations (and the "Tier-1" recommendations in particular), the industry is heavily engaged in implementation of the so-called "FLEX" initiative to pre-position emergency response equipment and resources, and in plant walkdowns and other actions related to identification of seismic and flood vulnerabilities.  Additionally, there is much anticipation related to the NRC's Notice of Intended Rulemaking regarding Station Blackout.

One of the central and repeated messages from the conference sessions I attended, was the short supply of experienced engineers and related technical specialists.  There's a shortage of experienced specialists skilled in conducting plant walkdowns, performing safety and risk assessment analyses, and performing plant modifications.  It is clear the industry will face significant challenges in meeting the human resource needs related to timely and adequate response to evolving Fukushima lessons-learned.

Gives the 50's to 60's age group (like me) who lived through TMI-2 and it's aftermath an opportunity to contribute the the industry we all feel is so vital to the long-term interests of humanity.

Cheers,

Sherrell

Post # 67: John Rowe & Mike Simpson On The Nuclear Renaissance

Last week I attended the annual meeting of the American Nuclear Society, held this year in Chicago.  (Before I forget to mention it, let me say how impressed I was with the beauty of Chicago's downtown waterfront / river walk district.  And I'm definitely not a big-city type of guy...)

Those of you who are regular readers of this blog know I am a pro-nuclear energy advocate.  I'm absolutely convinced that access to affordable and reliable electricity is the chief determinant of the quality of life for our fellow Earth-dwellers.  I am, therefore, distressed that billions of people have little or no access to electricity.  I'm also a pro-environment advocate.  These two convictions lie at the foundation of my belief that nuclear power is a key to a sustainable planet.

Now back to the meeting...  One of two "celebrity speakers" in the opening plenary session was John Rowe.  Rowe, in addition to being the retired CEO of Exelon (the largest market-cap electric utility in the country), is the past chairman of both the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI).  His message to the assembled group (which appeared to me to number well in excess of a thousand attendees) was basically that the nuclear power industry has to face facts – stare the dragon in the mouth as I would say.  Rowe had two basic points:

1.  Cheap natural gas will probably be with us for at least 10 years - perhaps much longer.  There will be no nuclear renaissance while this is the case.  (Because most utilities will, of course, opt for combined-cycle gas turbine power plant additions.)

2.  When the nuclear renaissance does happen, the nuclear power plant of choice will have to be much simpler than present-day systems and much more passive.  And it will likely be a small modular reactor (SMR).

Another "celebrity" speaker at the plenary was Congressman Mike Simpson (R – ID).  Congressman Simpson, along with Sen. Lamar Alexander (R – TN) is a leading advocate of common-sense energy policies that include a major role for nuclear power and a balanced energy generation portfolio approach.  Congressman Simpson's basic message was, "Congress is broken, and I don't know how to fix it" - my translation, not his precise words.)  He also pointedly bemoaned a lack of consistency in DOE policies from administration to administration, a lack of specificity in DOE budget requests, and the challenges of staying on program across Congressional shift changes (every 2 years in the House and 6 years in the Senate).

What is one to think in the face of these words from two informed, pro-nuclear, pro-energy leaders?

My thoughts...

1.  Natural gas will not stay cheap.  Several companies are working around the clock to build the infrastructure required to export liquified natural gas (LNG).  When this is accomplished, our domestic natural gas will become a "world supply", and its price will move to world market prices.  That is, it's price will increase significantly above current domestic natural gas prices.  I continue to be concerned about the practice of fracking – both in terms of it substantial use of ground water, and the potential of fracked oil and gas wells to leak into and contaminate ground water aquifers.  It is for this reason some countries forbid its use.  A single incident in the U.S. in which a major aquifer is contaminated would evoke major regulatory changes in the fracking business.  I sincerely hope this never happens, but it could.  Even if gas does stay cheap, prudence and experience should motivate the pursuit of mixed energy generation portfolios to avoid the "all the eggs in one basket" vulnerability.

2.  With regard to Congress, I'm as lost as Congressman Simpson in attempting to identify solutions.  Unlike some folks, I do not believe Congress is The Problem.  I believe Congress is a manifestation of The Problem.  Our elected officials are, I believe, representing the views of the folks who elected them. (That's the great thing about a republic.)  So the breakdown in Congress actually mirrors, "The Problem" – a breakdown of the core shared values & world views that have guided our country since 1776.  Choose any major issue of the day – social, economic, energy, defense, etc.  Our nation is clearly split, divided, fractured far beyond anything I've seen during my lifetime.  This worries me because as a (very) amateur student of history, my read is that nations that manifest these characteristics tend to have two destinies.  Either (a) they continue on a downward spiral of disintegration into the faded pages of history, or (b) they are reunited by some external threat that so endangers their existence as to re-set their collective national views and values. The threat can be economic, militaristic, health & welfare, etc.  Neither of these two scenarios are attractive and I hope and pray they do not occur.  But history is history.  Oh... and I've also become a believer in term limits for all elected officials.  Politics should not be a lifetime career.  It should be a citizen-service.  But more about that at another time...

Enough for today.  I've got real work to do :)

Sherrell